The US is currently taking the position that the military action it proposes to take against Iraq in the event of any new violation of its inspection obligations is authorized under existing resolutions of the Security Council. Among the forty-one resolutions adopted by the Security Council relating to Iraq, the only one conferring any authority to use military force is Resolution 678 (1990) which was adopted on 29 November 1990 several weeks prior to the Gulf War. The paragraph in that resolution that is generally accepted as authorizing the use of military force is paragraph 2:

2. [The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter] . . . authorizes Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements as set forth in paragraph 1 above the foregoing resolutions to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.

Following the Gulf War, the Security Council adopted a long detailed resolution bringing into effect a cease-fire and imposing obligations on Iraq relating to inspection and destruction of its weapons of mass destruction. This was Resolution 687 (1991). Shortly after the resolution was adopted, Iraq agreed to all its terms.

Section V of this paper explains why the military mandate given by paragraph 2 of Resolution 678 (1990) was terminated by the cease-fire at the close of the Gulf War as a result of paragraph 6 of Resolution 687 (1991). Unless it can be revived in some way, paragraph 2 is no longer effective - it is a dead letter - in which event, no authority for military action can be said to exist under any of the resolutions of the Security Council currently in effect.

Various arguments have been advanced in an effort to show that paragraph 2 has been revived - or will be revived in the event of any further violation by Iraq of its inspection obligations. The argument heard most frequently is that the cease-fire agreement, which is incorporated in Resolution 687 (1991), was conditional, and accordingly any noncompliance by Iraq would mean that the military mandate given in paragraph 2 would be revived. Section VI of this paper explains several reasons why this argument is fallacious:

1. The cease-fire agreement, incorporated in Resolution 687 (1991), nowhere states that it is to be conditional.
2. If the condition in question could somehow be considered as implied, it would have no practical effect because paragraph 34 of the cease-fire agreement would prevent other parties from enforcing the inspection obligations because it specifies that problems with implementation of the agreement are to be handled by the Security Council.
3. Again, if the condition in question could somehow be considered as implied, and if paragraph 34 could somehow be ignored, the condition could not take effect automatically; it would have to be enforced through action - not by the United States - but by the Security Council, because the US is not a party to the agreement. Since the Security Council has taken no such action, the condition remains dormant.

Accordingly, paragraph 2, the only possible source of authority for military action, cannot be said to have been revived by any breach of condition. Having been terminated at the close of the Gulf War by paragraph 6 of Resolution 687 (1991), and having not been revived, paragraph 2 remains a dead letter.

There are those who argue that paragraph 2 of the Resolution 678 (1990) should be considered as having survived the cease-fire on the basis that it authorizes military action "to restore security in the area" and/or "to uphold and implement . . . all subsequent relevant resolutions." These arguments are examined in Section VII and are found to be without merit. For instance, it is explained why the term "all subsequent relevant resolutions" could not apply to Resolution 687 (1991).

Finally, it has been argued that the recent Security Council Resolution 1154, which speaks of "severest consequences" for any Iraqi violation, should be interpreted as conferring fresh authority for a military strike at this time. As explained in Section VIII, even if the resolution is interpreted as necessarily referring to military force, it is entirely lacking in specificity and for that reason cannot be said to confer any actual authority to use military force.