The following paper was published on the Internet in December 2002 by
the Acronym Institute (www.acronym.org.uk)
as part of its series Acronym Special Papers which are notified to a
list of diplomats, journalists and independent experts.
The practice of
making decisions only by consensus appears to be hindering the decision-making process
of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). When the
OPCW was established in 1997 - with a mandate to ensure the implementation of
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) - the treaty negotiators had agreed that
its two policy-making bodies, the Executive Council and the Conference of the
States Parties (CSP), should make decisions by two-thirds majority vote. (In
case of the CSP, the rule is consensus if possible, otherwise two-thirds
majority.)1 Despite these provisions in the Convention however,
during the Organisation's five-year history, with only three exceptions, all
decisions by both bodies have been made by consensus. The exceptions were two
decisions made in April 2002 calling for the dismissal of José Bustani as Director-General
and one decision in 1997 relating to the salary of the Director-General of the
Organisation.
It appears that
there is an informal understanding among all 145 states parties to the CWC2
that decisions will normally be made by consensus and that no state party will
stand up and call for a vote. Diplomats at the OPCW argue that by insisting on
consensus, they are avoiding problems with compliance. If decisions are forced
through Council by majority vote, they argue, the nay-sayers are likely to refuse
to comply. They point to the fact that the Organisation has had an impressive
record with compliance and they want to keep it that way.
The other side
of the coin is less encouraging. The policy of insisting on making decisions by
consensus is causing two problems. Achieving consensus takes time, and in the
case of the OPCW, the Executive Council is constantly deferring important
decisions. The point has been reached where a large backlog of undecided
matters has developed. Included are matters that need to be decided in order
for the Organisation to do the work mandated under the Convention. In April
2001, Council's report to the CSP contained a list of 52 "Matters under
Consideration by the Council". Among the items listed are:
Shortly after
publication of the above report, the prestigious Howard Sussex Program
commented on the list of 52 items (herein the Agenda List), saying it
demonstrated an "increasing paralysis in the policy-making organs of the
Organisation, especially the Council".4 The latest version of
the Agenda List, which appeared in the Council's report to the CSP in
October covering events to July 16, 20025, indicated that the list
had grown to 56 items.6 The four items referred to above are still
on the list.7
As with several
other items on the Agenda List, the four examples cited seem to indicate
that some important rules have yet to be agreed upon setting forth details as
to how or when certain inspections are to be conducted. It would appear that
these are not new inspections - in the sense of being inspections that have
only been recently recognised as being necessary. Most of them seem to be
inspections of a type that should have been carried out soon after the
Convention entered into force in 1997. We are left wondering under what
arrangements these inspections are being conducted currently, or whether they
are being conducted at all. It seems incomprehensible that these matters remain
undecided five-and-a-half years after the Convention entered into force.
The second
difficulty with making decisions by consensus is that it is likely to produce
decisions that are watered down. Either they are expressed in terms that are
deliberately vague and ambiguous in order to satisfy competing interests and
thus achieve consensus. Or the decisions are such that they weaken the OPCW's
compliance system. Decisions dealing with the details of inspections, for
instance, are likely to reflect the wishes of countries favouring the least
intrusive form of inspection. Similarly, in the case of decisions dealing with
the Organisation's annual budget; those in favour of keeping expenses to a
minimum are likely to get their way - even if the money voted is insufficient
to cover the cost of all the programs that have been agreed upon.
For instance,
the consensus policy was responsible for the adoption of an inadequate budget
for the year 2002.8 Following the adoption of this budget, it was
widely predicted that the resulting shortage of funds would mean severe
cutbacks in the number of inspections performed in the year 2002. Such indeed
is proving to be the case; as of June 1st, the Secretariat calculated that
there would be enough money to conduct about 155 inspections in 2002 - just
over 50% of the total inspections agreed upon and programmed for the year.9
Faced with this bleak prospect, there were some who believed it would be
necessary to adopt a supplementary budget for 2002. As has happened so often in
the past, however, consensus again interfered; the only thing Council was able
to agree upon was that the budget deficit for 2002 was "a cause of extreme
concern".10
When the
seventh session of the CSP met in October, the Council presented no
recommendation for a supplementary budget. As of this writing, the status of
the inspections for 2002 is uncertain. It seems that some last-minute voluntary
contributions received from several countries (including the US) may have been
sufficient to allow the programmed inspections to be completed.11
As the time
approached for the Council to recommend a budget for 2003 for presentation to
the meeting of the CSP in October, its insistence on consensus was again
responsible for causing a crisis. Desperate last-minute efforts failed to
produce agreement and the matter was therefore referred to the Conference with
no recommendation from the Executive Council - this despite the fact that the
Convention expressly requires the Council to make such a recommendation.12
It seems that even when it results in the Council acting illegally, the Council
still insists on following its unwritten rule: no consensus, no decision.
When the budget
came up for consideration by the Conference, even in that context the meeting
insisted on deciding the matter by consensus. Again, there was acute difficulty
in finding agreement, and it was only when the final meeting was extended for
several hours that consensus was achieved. It remains to be seen whether the
figure agreed upon (68.6 million Euros) proves to be sufficient to fund all the
inspections (and other items) programmed for 2003, or whether the figure turns
out to be insufficient - as it was for 2002. (For a different view on the
OPCW's budgetting problems, see Box.)
OPCW Budgeting Problems - Whose Fault?
This paper proceeds on the assumption that
the OPCW for several years has been operating under an inadequate budget and
that the fault lies entirely with the Executive Council and the Conference of
the States Parties. A very different assessment can be seen in a recent
report of the US General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of the US
Congress.i The report, while conceding that recent
budgets have been insufficient to produce the funds needed to pay for all the
programmed inspections, concludes that the fault lies with the Secretariat.
Throughout the report, the authors assume that the Secretariat decides on the
content of the budget. They fail to mention that the Convention places the
responsibility for adopting the annual programme and budget upon the
Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties.ii Nor
does the report mention the long and disputatious meetings of those two
bodies in an effort to reach consensus on the budget.iii As for
the Secretariat's position on the budget, the report ignores the many
occasions when the previous Director-General (on behalf of the Secretariat)
pleaded for a larger budget - one substantially larger than the one
eventually adopted by the Conference.iv i.. "Chemical Weapons - Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Needs Comprehensive Plan to Correct
Budgeting Weaknesses", US General Accounting Office, October 2002.
Available online at: http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-5. ii.. CWC, Article VIII.32(a) and 21(a) iii.. For an account of the negotiations
leading to the adoption of the budget for 2002, see Douglas Scott, "OPCW
Lacks Funds for Inspections", Compliance Matters, the Newsletter
of The Markland Group, Issue No. 16 (December 2001) published in the Canadian
Council on International Law Bulletin, vol. 27, no. 4, page 14,
available online at: http://www.hwcn.org/link/mkg/issue_no._16.html.
iv.. ibid. |
The majority
members of the Executive Council appear to be aware that their policy of
insisting on consensus is not only causing severe delays in the making of
decisions, but also where decisions cannot be avoided, as in the case of the
budget, it can be assumed that they are aware that their policy is producing
decisions that reflect the lowest common denominator. What is baffling about
the craze for deciding everything by consensus is its unanimity. Despite the
fact that any individual state party among the 145 members of the OPCW is
entitled to call for a vote on any issue under discussion, it almost never
happens.
The key to
explaining this anomaly may lie in the fact that the US seems to be in the minority
not only on budget matters, but also on many of the undecided issues appearing
on the Agenda List. Such a scenario suggests that the US may have let it
be known that it is insisting on all decisions being made by consensus except
where it anticipates that the required majority will vote its way (as was the
case in the two votes to dismiss Bustani). Furthermore, it seems possible that
the US has sent clear signals that any deviation from decision-making by
consensus will result in the withdrawal of US support for the OPCW and possibly
withdrawal from membership in the Treaty.
If this indeed
is the US position, it would explain why there have been only two instances
where a vote has been taken for a decision by the Executive Council. Even in
cases where it is eminently clear that a draft decision has the support of
two-thirds of the members, no member state has risen to call for a vote. A
possible explanation of this curious behaviour would be that any delegation
contemplating calling for a vote on a draft decision would abandon the idea
because it would assume that almost all of the delegations supporting the
substance of the draft would still vote against it for fear of bringing about
the downfall of the Organisation.
This thinking
probably explains the large majority that voted for the US motions to dismiss
Bustani in April 2002. It was never clear that the required majority had agreed
with the substance of the US complaints against Bustani. Very few of the
countries voting with the US have explained their vote in terms of agreeing
with the complaints leveled by the US against Bustani.13 Most have
remained silent, while some have asserted, as Canada did unofficially, that the
prime reason they voted with the US was to avoid a harmful dispute which could
jeopardise the future of the Organisation.14
All of which
suggests that, in addition to the compliance motive for insisting on consensus
as the method for making decisions, there is another more pragmatic reason in
the minds of the states parties to the CWC, namely that the US has insisted on
consensus and has made it a condition of its continued support for the OPCW.
Thus, it is
clear that there are two entirely different factors militating for the
consensus approach. The traditional factor emphasizes the importance of
maximizing compliance; it is based on the assumption that countries that have
participated in a consensus decision will be likely to comply with it. This
type of thinking (herein 'the compliance factor') obviously applies in contexts
far beyond the OPCW.
The other
factor, which is specific to the OPCW, is concern for preventing the US from
withdrawing its support for the Treaty's compliance system. Countries for whom
this factor is important would no doubt argue that simple prudence dictates the
necessity of making decisions by consensus. They no doubt believe that voting
against the US would risk causing the US to decide between openly flouting may
of the Council's decisions and exercising its right to withdraw from the
Convention.15 In either event, the very integrity of the Convention
would be at risk.
There can be
little doubt that the paralysis that has afflicted the OPCW's two
decision-making bodies is due solely to the tradition of making decisions by
consensus, which in turn appears to be based on these two motivating factors:
the need to maximize compliance and the need to protect the integrity of the
OPCW. This situation clearly calls for a reassessment of the importance of
these factors. Are they sufficiently important to justify the cap on the budget
and the logjam in the decision-making process?
Consider first
the compliance factor. Certain recent events suggest that its importance has
been exaggerated. Instances are starting to appear where decisions have been
made by consensus - only to be followed by non-compliance on the part of
several of those that participated in the decision.
An example
taken from the decision-making experience of the IAEA is instructive. In the
early 1990's, the Board of Governors of the IAEA began negotiating the terms of
a Model Protocol whose purpose was to strengthen the IAEA Safeguards System by
allowing its inspectors to have greater rights of access. It was the Board's
intention, after agreeing on the terms of the Model Protocol, to ask the
general membership of the IAEA to approve it and then to request each
individual member to sign a detailed version of the Protocol which would follow
the agreed Model. During the discussions on the wording of the Model, it soon
appeared that the Board members were split on the question of how much
additional access should be provided in the Model Protocol.
Towards the end
of the negotiations, The Markland Group submitted a brief to the Board members
arguing that they should depart from their tradition of making decisions by
consensus and should in this case decide the wording of the Model Protocol by
majority vote16, which the Board is permitted to do by its
constituent instrument.17 In response, it was argued that, if the
Board members in the minority group (which favoured a more restricted range of
additional rights of access) were out-voted, they would very likely refuse to
sign to the Protocol. The majority members eventually made concessions sufficient
to get the support of the minority, and accordingly the Model Additional
Protocol was adopted by consensus.18
The majority
members obviously expected that, as a result of their concessions, there would
be no problem with compliance - at least among the 35 members of the Board.
Compliance in this instance would mean signing or ratifying a detailed version
of the Protocol in accordance with the agreed upon Model, and having done so,
granting access as specified therein.
It is now five
years since the Model Protocol was adopted by the Board and confirmed by the
general membership of the IAEA. Let us now look at the record of compliance
among the 35 countries that were members of the Board in 1996-97 when the Model
Protocol was negotiated.19 As of October 24, 2002, the record was as
follows:
It should be
noted that all of the ten defaulting members are considered by the IAEA to have
"significant nuclear activities", except Tunisia.24
A record of ten
defaulters and twelve laggards among the 35 decision-makers adds up to a rather
sorry achievement after five years - especially for a process that is supposed
to maximize compliance.
But would this
result have been any better had the Board decided to adopt the Model Protocol
by a majority vote? That question needs to be debated. Suffice it to say at
this point that the Model Protocol would likely have contained better rights of
access. But this benefit would have to be weighed against the cost: if the
decision had been taken by majority vote, the compliance record might have been
even worse. Some analysis is needed of the likely long-term effects of each of
the two decision-making processes in the context of the IAEA Model Protocol.25
In the meantime, the theory that the consensus method of making decisions can
be counted on to maximize the chances of compliance must be regarded as open to
question.
The decision in
the IAEA case was one that dealt with requirements for verification of
compliance with a disarmament treaty. As such, it dealt with matters very
similar to many of those customarily dealt with by the OPCW Executive Council.
The IAEA experience with decisions by consensus is therefore highly relevant to
decision-making in the context of the OPCW.
In addition to
the compliance factor, the other factor motivating the CWC parties to insist on
consensus needs to be reassessed - namely the importance of retaining the
support of the US in order to maintain the integrity of the OPCW. With a view
to highlighting the issue, let it be taken as read that the following set of
assumptions represents the current state of the OPCW:
1.
That the US is insisting on the right to cap the budget at a level
acceptable to it.
2.
That the US is insisting on the Director-General behaving in a manner
acceptable to it and on having the right to replace him or her when it deems
necessary.
3.
That the US is insisting that a significant number of the 56 undecided
issues now on the Agenda List be resolved in a manner acceptable to it -
including the four issues referred to above.
4.
That were it not for the US position on these issues, the required two-thirds
majority of the CWC parties would find a way to resolve them in short order,
and that the only reason they have not done so is their concern about an
adverse reaction on the part of the US.
5.
That, were the two-thirds majority to proceed at this point to resolve
those issues by out-voting the US, the result would be that the US would adopt
an ongoing position of antagonism to the OPCW and would curtail or terminate
its financial support and would curtail inspections on its territory to a level
of its own choosing.
These
assumptions obviously present a worst-case scenario, but one that is possibly
not too far from the minds of many of the delegations at The Hague. Assuming
the above scenario to be reasonably close to reality and assuming in particular
that the US reaction would be as stated, quite obviously, there are serious
problems for the OPCW. But the alternative courses seem to involve serious
problems too.
The alternative
courses currently available to be taken by the assumed two-thirds majority
would appear to be as follows:
1.
They could accede to the US demands on the matter of the budget and on the
matter of the undecided issues on the Agenda List.
2.
They could continue the current standoff indefinitely as regards to the Agenda
List while continuing to accede on the budget.
3.
They could abandon the consensus approach and out-vote the US not only to
adopt their own version of the budget, but also to resolve some of the issues
on the Agenda List in a manner agreeable to them; and they could adopt a
measure that would give the Director-General security of tenure during his term
of office.
Let us now
examine and compare some of the more obvious problems involved with each of the
alternatives.
If the members
of the majority group were to opt for the first alternative and accede to most
of the US demands, they would, inter alia, accede to the wishes of the US on
the matters covered in the Agenda List, including the issues relating to
the manner of conducting inspections. This would mean that binding inspection
rules would be adopted in a form that the majority group would presumably
consider to be substantially weaker than what is called for in the Convention.
Furthermore, in order to comply with the US budgetary demands, they would
probably have to scale down the number of inspections. Also, they would leave
uncorrected the highly unsatisfactory precedent created by the manner in which
Ambassador Bustani was dismissed as Director-General. In a word, acceding the
US position would weaken the effectiveness of the Convention.
The second
alternative is the one currently being implemented by the majority group. But
we are left wondering how long the impasse should be continued. From one
perspective, there are good reasons for continuing the standoff. Assuming the
impasse consists mainly of opposing positions being taken by the majority group
on the one hand, and the US and possibly a few supporters on the other, and
assuming the points at issue include the details needed for certain types of
inspection (as in the case of the four examples given above), then the majority
is to be commended for its principled stand.
But the present
situation cannot continue indefinitely, because the Convention's compliance
system is slowly being undermined. The number of inspections would continue to
be curtailed in order to meet the budgetary limits insisted upon by the US.
Detailed rules relating to inspection access and inspection equipment are being
left in suspense. Some idea of the subject matter of these rules can be
gathered from the four examples cited above taken from the Agenda List.
Since these rules have not been agreed upon, it means that certain inspections
are either not occurring or that they are taking place under unauthorised
arrangement that the US finds acceptable. No information has been released by
the OPCW as to which approach is currently in place. If these inspections are
currently being deferred pending agreement on details as to methods and timing,
this is a heavy price to pay for continuing the standoff.
The problems
involved in the third alternative are also unpalatable. Under the assumptions
noted above, the US contribution to the OPCW budget would be reduced or lost
altogether, which would place an additional burden on the remaining parties. On
the other hand, the majority group would presumably vote through a set of
inspection rules that would be drafted so as to accord with their view of the
requirements of the Convention. As a result, not only would there be adequate
inspections rules; the very fact that the Executive Council was adopting any
rules would make it possible to proceed with certain inspections that possibly
are being deferred pending adoption of rules. But in adopting such rules, the
majority group would be aware that the OPCW would very likely find that it was
confronted with numerous serous infractions of these rules on the part of the
US and possibly other parties. Indeed, the OPCW would very likely find that it
was compelled to ask its members to accept types of inspection that the US (and
possibly others) were refusing to accept. Also, the majority group would have
to face the fact that the US was no longer friendly with the OPCW generally,
and may even withdraw from the Convention altogether.
Clearly, all
three alternative courses of action open to the majority group entail a serious
weakening of the effectiveness of the OPCW. Accepting that a measure of damage
to the Convention will occur no matter which of the three alternatives is
chosen, it is important to consider the longevity of the damage as well as the
breadth of the damage that is likely to occur in each of the three cases.
In the case of
the first alternative, since it would mean adopting looser-than-adequate
inspection rules which would apparently be permanent, the damage would be
long-lasting. Furthermore, the scope of the damage would be very broad, since
the inadequate rules would apply to all CWC parties.
The longevity
of the damage involved in the second alternative would depend on the length of
the current standoff. In the meantime, the breadth of the damage would depend
on the nature of the arrangements currently in place for the conduct of the
inspections referred to in the Agenda List. If the affected inspections
are all on hold for all CWC parties, the damage would be even broader.
In the case of
the third alternative, the longevity of the damage could be long or short -
depending on how long the US persists with its unilateral behaviour.
Eventually, the US, in all likelihood, possibly under a future administration,
will agree to join the rest of the CWC parties and will accept the rules that
will have been adopted by the assumed two-thirds majority.
Fortunately,
during the interim period of waiting for a US policy change, the breadth of the
damage under the third alternative would be minimal. The loss of US financial
support would entail an increased assessment of possibly 30% - not an
unbearable burden - and the figure could be lower if the US decides on a policy
of self-inspection. There would be adequate rules of inspection (a result not
available under the other two alternatives). The budget would be sufficient to
fund the required volume of inspections (again, an improvement over the other
two). Also, with security of tenure, the Director-General could be counted on
to make rulings that will be generally perceived as having been made free of
undue influence from the US. And quite possibly, the intensity of the
inspections currently being conducted in the US would continue undiminished
despite the anticipated antagonism of the US - especially if it is assumed that
the US is already controlling the intensity to its liking.
With the
appointment of a new Director-General26 in July, and with the opportunities
for decision-making offered by the meeting of the Conference in October, some
improvement in the situation described above might have been expected.
Regrettably, as of this writing, little has changed.
Consider for
instance, the Council's backlog of undecided matters. The list of decisions
taken by the Conference in October 2002 confirming those of the Executive
Council27 indicates that, of the 56 items referred to above on the Agenda
List, as of July 16, 2002, only five had been decided by the Conference.28
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the budget for 2003, approved by
the Conference with such difficulty, will prove, as with prior years, to be
inadequate. Two items in recent reports seem to point to an acknowledgement by
the Organisation that it will have inadequate funds for the coming year. One
report notes that during that 2003, the funding for the Secretariat staff is
such that 33 positions will have to be left vacant.29 Also, there is
a report of a recent decision that authorizes the Secretariat "as an
exceptional measure" to borrow from the Working Capital Fund for the
purposes of financing budgetary appropriations in 2002 and 2003 "…to be
reimbursed not later than the end of the financial periods 2003 and 2004
respectively."30 This would appear to be a desperation tactic
since it is contrary to an express provision in the Organisation's Financial
Regulations.31 It is certainly an admission that the Organisation's
budget for 2003 is inadequate.
Another
interesting development is the publication of a much more comprehensive survey
of the OPCW's performance by the well-known NGO based in London, VERTIC.32
Its assessment of the situation differs somewhat from the views expressed
herein. Although it refers to the tardiness of the Executive Council in making
decisions, among the causes it examines, there is no mention of the Council's
insistence on making decisions by consensus. On the matter of the budget, the
study notes the Organization's operating deficit for 2002 in the amount of five
million euros and the paucity of recent increases in the budget, but it ignores
the role of the consensus policy in producing this situation.
Finally, it
should be mentioned that a delegation from the US House of Representatives
visited the OPCW in The Hague on November 20-21. A brief press release from the
Organization33 lists some of the topics discussed: the status of
destruction of chemical weapons, the monitoring of transfers of chemicals and
chemical terrorism; but apparently there was no talk about the tight financial
situation.
As noted, this
paper proceeds on the assumption that the US and possibly a few others are
currently blocking agreement by the Executive Council on decisions dealing with
many of the 56 issues appearing on the Council's Agenda List.
Furthermore, it is assumed that, were it not for the consensus factor, the
Council would have little trouble in arriving at decisions on most of these
items since agreement on the issues could readily be found among a majority of
the delegations at The Hague - a majority sufficiently numerous to constitute
the required two-thirds of the Council members.
If this picture
of the current situation on the Council is somewhere close to reality, then it
could be said that the future of the OPCW lies in the hands of this (possibly
amorphous) majority.
The dilemma
confronting this majority is how to limit the damage currently being inflicted
on the Convention by the US and to do so without causing further damage. Part
of the damage inflicted thus far, although serious, need not be permanent. The
recurring problem of inadequate budgets could be cured by subsequent decisions
by the Council and the Conference. But damage of a more permanent nature would
likely result if the majority delegations were to acquiesce on the matter of
inspection rules. The result could be a set of loosely worded rules that would
make it easy for states parties intent on acquiring chemical weapons to conceal
their activities within their civilian chemical industry. It appears that the
US has a preference for inspection rules that are loosely worded and minimally
intrusive. This preference is no doubt based on:
Loosely worded
rules, however, once in place, could remain indefinitely.
Concern about
the permanence of weak inspection rules may be what is preventing the majority
of delegations at The Hague from acquiescing to the US on these and other items
on the Agenda List. If so, they are to be commended. But how long should
the majority parties hold out? How long should inadequate budgets be tolerated?
If, as suggested, certain inspections are being deferred, how long should that
situation be tolerated? How long can the Organisation operate effectively with
a Director-General who is always subject to replacement at the will of the US?
If the majority
delegations were to start outvoting the US on these and other issues, what
would be the full extent of the consequences? This paper attempts to explore some
of them, but more analysis is needed - especially analysis by non-governmental
experts. The key question needing discussion is what would be the likely
long-term result if the majority delegations attempted to operate the OPCW with
no support from the US and possibly with a degree of opposition. Is it indeed
possible for the implementing body of a multilateral disarmament treaty
designed for universal application to operate without the support of the US?
What should be done when the price of keeping the US involved becomes adopting
measures that substantially weaken the treaty's compliance system?
Given the
current standoff, it would appear that the majority delegations at The Hague
are wrestling with these very questions.
The same
questions are even more starkly facing the states parties to the Biological
Weapons Convention. Since the US has already declared its opposition to a
compliance protocol, the remaining parties are compelled to consider whether it
would be possible to operate a compliance system and an implementing body
without the support of the US.
At stake is an
issue of fundamental importance. Should the process of world disarmament
proceed at a pace, and on terms, dictated by the US? Or, if there are enough
countries willing to move at a faster pace, and on different terms, should they
proceed without the US?
1. Chemical
Weapons Convention, Article VIII, paragraphs 18 and 29.
2. Status of
the Chemical Weapons Convention - Summary as of 27 September 2002:
S/320/2002, 9 October 2002. Available online at http://www.opcw.org/html/global/s_series/2k2/s320_02.html.
3. OPCW
document: Report of the Executive Council on the Performance of its Activities
(3 April 2000 - 23 February 2001), EC.XXXIV/3, 6 April 2001, paragraph 6,
subparagraphs (l), (p), (v) and (dd).
4. Harvard
Sussex Program Quarterly Review No. 34, published as part of the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Convention Bulletin, No. 52 (June 2001), p. 3.
5. Report of
the Executive Council on the Performance of its Activities (24 February 2001 to
16 July 2002), EC-M-21/2, C-7/2, 3 October 2002.
6. Fiona
Tregonning, the current Harvard-Sussex Programme Intern at the OPCW
Secretariat, writing in a recent issue of Disarmament Diplomacy, gives a
different figure. She refers to this list as containing 38 items. The
difference appears to be due to a different method of counting. Under the
method used herein to generate the figure 56 (and the figure 52 in the previous
version of the Agenda List), where an item includes several sub-items,
eg. item (n), the sub-items were counted but not the item itself. Thus, item
(n) was counted as 10 items. See Fiona Tregonning "Emerging from a Trial
by Fire? The Seventh Session of the Conference of States Parties" in Disarmament
Diplomacy No. 66, October/November, 2002, p. 14.
7. Report of
the Executive Council, supra Note 5, para. 6(k), (n)(iv), (n)(x) and
(v)(i); see also subparagraph (ii).
8. For an
account of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the budget for 2002,
see The Markland Group Newsletter, Compliance Matters, No. 16, (December
2001), http://www.hwcn.org/link/mkg/issue_no._16.html.
9. Harvard
Sussex Program Quarterly Review No. 38, in CBWCB No. 56 (June 2002), p. 12.
10. Ibid, p.
10.
11. Chemical
and Biological Weapons Convention Bulletin No. 57, p. 18. See also Opening
Statement by the Director-General to the Conference of the States Parties at
its seventh session (7 October 2002), C-7/DG.4, paragraph 16.
12. Article
VIII, paragraph 32(a).
13. For a brief
account of the dismissal of Ambassador Bustani, see Douglas Scott,
"Director-General of OPCW Ousted", Canadian Council on
International Law Bulletin, Winter 2002, p. 15. See also Douglas Scott,
"Statement re Dismissal of OPCW Director General", (April 2002), http://www.hwcn.org/link/mkg/statement.html.
14. Author's
conversation with official at the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade.
15. CWC,
Article XVI.2, provides that any party may give 90 days notice of its intention
to withdraw from the Convention "if it decides that extraordinary events,
related to the subject matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme
interests of its country."
16. The
Markland Group, "Proposal for Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards System - A
Brief Submitted by The Markland Group Addressed to the Members of the Board of
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency" (October 1996), http://www.hwcn.org/mkg/brief/html.
Pp. 4-15.
17. The
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Article VI, para. E.
"Provisional Rules of Procedure by the Board of Governors"
(GOV/INF/Rev.1), paras. 36 and 37 - http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/statute.html.
18. IAEA
document, Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and
the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards:
INCIRC/540(corrected).
19. The Members
of the Board of Governors for the years 1996-97 are listed in IAEA Bulletin,
No. 4/1995, p. 38.
20. Austria,
Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Romania and
Switzerland - IAEA Document: Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of
Additional Protocols as of 24 October 2002: http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/Safeguards/sg_protcols.html.
21. Germany,
Portugal, The Netherlands and United Kingdom: ibid.
22. Belgium,
Cuba, Denmark, France, Kuwait, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Republic of Korea,
Russia, South Africa and USA: ibid.
23. Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the
United Arab Emirates: ibid.
24. IAEA Annual
Report 2001, Table A21.
25. This is one
of the questions analyzed in The Markland Group brief referred to in endnote
13.
26. Rogelio
Pfirter, a diplomat from Argentina with experience in disarmament matters and a
former ambassador to the United Kingdom (1995-2000).
27. Untitled
Document published by the Organisation's internet website (as of November
26, 2002), available online at http://www.opcw.org/html/global/c_series/csp7/cseries_arch_c7_mainframe.html.
28. The five items
are those listed in paragraph 6(a)-(d) and (i) in Report of the Executive
Council, supra, Note 6.
29.
"Emerging from a Trial by Fire?" supra Note 6, p. 12.
30. ibid, p.
13.
31. OPCW
Financial Regulations, C-1/DEC/3, paragraph 6.6: "All transfers of funds
made from the Working Capital Fund to finance budgetary appropriations shall be
reimbursed as soon as feasible, but in any case within the financial period in
which they are made".
32.
Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre: Getting Verification
Right - Proposals for Enhancing Implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, 24 pp, London 2002, pp. 15-21.
33. OPCW press
release no. 69, 26 November 2002, available online at http://www.org/html/global/press_releases/2k2/PR69_2002prt.html.
Douglas
Scott is a lawyer in Ancaster, Ontario, Canada. He is the President of The
Markland Group, which is concerned with the enforcement of disarmament
treaties.
© 2002 The
Acronym Institute.