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Recent developments relating to compliance with
multilateral treaties in the
area of disarmament and international security.
The newsletter of the Markland Group
Issue No. 20, June 2003
This newsletter was originally
published as part of the Canadian Council on International Law Bulletin, Vol.
29, No. 2, Summer 2003.
I. Targeted Sanctions – The Report Of
The Stockholm Process
II. Booknote: La Vérification de l’Élimination de
l’Arme Chimique by Jocelyn Clerckx
Dated February 2003, the
Report, presents the results of a year-long study by a committee of 123 experts
from 35 countries drawn from academia, national governments, NGO's,
intergovernmental organizations and the UN Secretariat. Financed by the government of Sweden, the participants
met in a series of working groups and plenary meetings.
Entitled Making Targeted
Sanctions Effective – Guidelines for the Implementation of UN Policy
Options, the Report, edited by Peter Wallensteen, was published by the
Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsalla University. It is available on the Internet at www.peace.uu.se.
The Stockholm Process was a
continuation of two previous initiatives, the first of which was sponsored by
the government of Switzerland in 1998 and 1999 under the name Interlaken
Process which focused exclusively on financial sanctions. This was followed in December 2000 by the
Bonn-Berlin Process sponsored by Germany, which studied arms embargos, aviation
bans and travel bans. The results of
these two initiatives were presented to the UN Security Council in two volumes
in October 2001[1], at which time Sweden announced its
intention to sponsor a third process, concentrating on the implementation
aspects of targeted sanctions of all types.
Targeted sanctions are
defined in the Report as those "directed against significant national
decision-makers (political leaders and key supporters of particular regimes)
and resources that are essential for their rule" (p. iii). The Report is comprised entirely of a series
of detailed recommendations directed to members of the UN Security Council
intended to improve the efficacy of future regimes involving targeted
sanctions. Four types of sanctions are
considered:
·
financial sanctions – freezing assets held abroad
·
travel sanctions – restricting travel by designated
individuals
·
aviation sanctions – restricting air travel generally
·
arms embargo – focused on conventional weapons
The Report recommends the
creation of expert panels to monitor compliance by member States and to offer
them assistance in complying. Also
recommended is greater precision on the part of the Security Council in
defining what is required of member States.
Another recommendation would have the Council appoint a UN sanctions
coordinator who would be available to all the Sanctions Committee chairpersons[2].
Also, the Report recognizes
the necessity of national legislation in the implementation of most types of
targeted sanctions. It therefore
recommends that the Security Council adopt a model law to guide member States
in the enactment of their legislation.
A detailed text of the model law is offered (with provisions for civil
law countries that differ from those for common law countries)[3].
The Report makes no attempt
to assess the efficacy of targeted sanctions assuming its recommendations were
put in place. Also, it has very little
to say about the success of past efforts to impose targeted sanctions. For instance, it gives none of the details
of the aviation sanctions imposed on Libya from 1992 to 1999[4]
- despite the fact that this particular sanctions effort was an obvious success[5].
Nor is there any mention of
the travel ban that was imposed upon certain government officials in the last
stages of the sanctions regime against Iraq.
The episode was significant, because this was the last time the Security
Council made any effort to penalize Iraq for its non-cooperation with
inspections and it was followed by increasing obstruction of the inspections[6]. (Although authorized by the Security
Council[7],
the travel ban was never actually enforced, because the Iraqis appear to have
persuaded their friends on the Security Council to block approval of the list
of individuals that would be targeted).
Notwithstanding the absence
of any assessment of the results that could be expected from carefully designed
and monitored targeted sanctions, the Report should be of great value to busy
diplomats when faced with the next
call for targeted sanctions.
As
with the two previous processes, the results of the Stockholm Process were
presented to a closed meeting of the UN Security Council. The published report of that meeting[8]
indicates that, although all the speakers expressed general approval of its
recommendations, the Council took no formal action on the Process.
The
following are excerpts from the statements made by the speakers at the meeting
of the Council as reported in the UN Press Report issued following the meeting[9].
Carlos Pujalte, Mexico:
The
recommendations of the Stockholm Process are particularly relevant to the work
of the Council and its sanctions committees…the inclusion of a reporting
requirement on sanctions violations into the mandates of peacekeeping
operations should also be considered.
Alexander Konuzin, Russian Federation:
The
study introduced today would be extremely useful in the United Nations. I hope
its recommendations will be properly assessed by member States and of practical
use to the Organization.
Mikhail Wehbe, Syria:
The
Report of the Stockholm Process reflects the important aspects of evaluating
targeted sanctions, as well as the necessary means for enhancing the United
Nations’ role in their implementation.
Also, financial support must be considered for the affected States, in
order to increase their capacity to implement the sanctions.
Martin
Belinga Eboutou of Cameroon was the only speaker to mention the work of the
ongoing Security Council working group looking for ways to strengthen sanctions[10]:
The
working group on general issues relating to sanctions could make good use of
the ideas put forth in the report in achieving its goals…. Established in 2000,
the group was entrusted with drawing up general recommendations regarding
strengthening the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by the United
Nations. Its work deals with the
administration of sanctions…. Despite
the progress made differences of opinion remain, hampering the conclusion of
its work and the management of the sanctions regimes. Those differences deal primarily with the scope and length of
sanctions. I hope that those two
questions will receive due attention from the Council and civil society.
Jeremy
Greenstock, United Kingdom:
The
Stockholm Process moves to the next stage of sanctions design, that of better
implementation. There is no point in
adoption sanctions if the Council fails to enforce them. The United Kingdom and France have put
forward a proposal for a monitoring mechanism, and are looking at how
to adapt that idea to complement the recommendations of Stockholm. In doing so, we are looking to exploit the
synergies among the different panels and avoid overlap among monitors. Improved coordination and follow-up are
needed to make that work.
Richard Williamson, United States:
The Council’s imposition of
sanctions offers an approach greater than persuasion, but less than the use of
force to bring about desired behaviour.
Sanctions should be tied directly to the described change the Council
wished to see in an actor, rather than artificially linked to an arbitrary time
limit.
Danilo Türk, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs:
The Secretariat will remain
engaged in the Stockholm process…I would welcome any additional resources to
make strengthening this capacity of the Secretariat a reality.
An important study of the Chemical Weapons Convention has
recently come to our attention:
Jocelyn Clerckx, La
vérification de l'élimination de l'arme chimique – essai d'analyse et
d'évaluation de la Convention de Paris du 13 janvier 1993, Paris, Librairie
générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 2001, 307 pp. ISBN 2.275.02047.0
The book offers a valuable
summary, analysis and commentary mainly focused on the transparency obligations
under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
In the preface, Raymond Goy professeur émérite de l'Université de
Rouen, alludes to the broad perspective taken by the author: Il explique le droit par tout un constat
extrajuridique; il discute, interprète, critique ce droit; il propose, outre
diverses interprétations, un système de règlement juridictionnel; mais surtout,
il compare, et évalue les comparaisons entre divers modes de vérification en
droit du désarmement.
The first two parts are
largely analytical, whereas the third compares the powers of the OPCW with
those of the IAEA and concludes that there is an important disparité de
fonction between these two organizations.
Professor Clerckx is particularly interesting in his treatment of the
inspectors' rights of access (pages 116 to 138), a topic on which there are
some unresolved disputes currently confronting the Executive Council of the
OPCW.
Jocelyn Clerckx holds the
degree of docteur en droit from l'Université de Rouen. Currently, he is lecturing at l'Université
du Havre with the position of maître de conférences en droit publique.
The book is fully annotated
with an extensive bibliography, lacking only an index. There are no plans currently to publish an
English translation. It is available in
Canada through Librairie Champlain, Toronto, www.librairiechamplain.com.
Approximately $110 (delivery six to eight weeks).
It is with
much regret that we learned recently of the death of Paul Szasz, a valued
member of the Markland Group's Committee of Occasional Consultants. Professor Szasz was for many years until
1966 the Legal and Safeguards Officer at the IAEA, after which he held various
posts culminating in his position as Principal Legal Officer and Deputy to the
Legal Counsel at the United Nations in New York. At various times, he was an adjunct professor or visiting fellow
at several universities, including the New York University School of Law.
He was a valued consultant
to the Markland Group, especially in matters relating to the need to strengthen
the enforcement provisions of the NPT and the IAEA (a topic that seems likely
to receive renewed attention in the coming months).
Paul Szasz
died on 30 April 2003. A detailed
tribute can be seen in Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3×
[1] Security Council documents S/7183 and S/7187
[2] Report: paragraphs 30 and 46
[3] Report: paragraphs 236 to 243
[4] S/RES748 and 883
[5] For an assessment of the efficacy of targeted sanctions imposed by the Security Council up to the end of 2001, see David Cortright and George A. Lopez (eds): Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002). For a history and accounting of UN sanctions in general in the 1900’s, see David Cortright and George A. Lopez Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges for UN Action (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Reinner, 2002)
[6] Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat (New York, Public Affairs, 2000) pp. 153 to 221
[7] S/RES1137 (12 November 1997)
[8] S/7672, 25 February 2003
[9] SE/7672
[10] For information on the work of this group, see Compliance Matters, issue numbers 7 and 8