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Recent
developments relating to compliance with multilateral treaties in the
area of disarmament and international security.
The newsletter of the Markland Group
Issue No. 13, March 2001
This newsletter was originally published as part of the Canadian Council on International Law Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 1, Winter 2001. The version that follows has been slightly edited since it first appeared in the Bulletin.
I. Book Review – Butler, The Greatest
Threat
Compliance Mechanisms for Disarmament Treaties
Lessons of the Agreed Framework for Using Engagement as a
Non-Proliferation Tool
Honey and Vinegar - Incentives, Sanctions and Foreign
Policy
III. Can
rebel groups be persuaded to comply with the Landmines Convention?
IV. Richard
Butler on Treaty Enforcement
Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global
Security, (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2000).
Reviewed by Sean Howard*
Richard Butler’s account of his chairmanship of UNSCOM constitutes a powerful indictment both of the regime of Saddam Hussein in its obstruction of the disarmament efforts of the international community, and of powerful forces within that community in their obstruction and, in Butler’s view, ultimate betrayal of the Special Commission’s work. The condemnation of Iraq is unsurprising; the criticism of a number of key UN states – in particular, Russia, France and China – is, from the broader perspective of global non-proliferation efforts, far more troubling.
The book’s main claim is quickly established and forcibly developed: in the face of persistent Iraqi non-cooperation, the UN Security Council failed to keep the main issue – reversing a clandestine drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction – in view. The primary challenge of disarmament fell prey to secondary considerations: traditional geopolitical allegiances, fear of US ‘hyperpower’, repugnance at the humanitarian impact of sanctions, etc. Once it became clear to Iraq that the Council was a house divided, the UNSCOM project fell apart.
From Butler’s perspective, the Commission’s final decline began in October 1997 with the adoption of resolution 1134, intended to deal with the latest Iraqi obstruction. Such non-cooperation, Butler argues, was consistent with the pattern of ‘cheat, retreat and cheat again’ long-favoured by Baghdad but previously kept in check by critical Security Council resolutions reaffirming unified support for UNSCOM. However, in what Butler describes as “a shocking change of heart,” China, France and Russia abstained on 1134, a resolution which, while comparatively mild in tone, threatened to impose travel restrictions on Iraqi officials. Doubtless emboldened by the abstentions, Iraq responded defiantly, ordering the expulsion of US members of UNSCOM (and in effect refusing to end his obstruction). This dramatic move seems to mean – although Butler does not say this in so many words – that Saddam had become less concerned about the possibility of the Security Council imposing new sanctions targeted specifically at the leadership group.
Although Security Council unanimity was “surprisingly” restored in November 1997, with the adoption of resolution 1137 condemning Iraq’s expulsion order, Butler argues that the die had already been cast. From 1134 on, he suggests, Iraq was convinced the Security Council would be unlikely to penalize it for obstructing the inspectors, either through travel bans or in any other way.
Butler does not simply blame Moscow, Paris and Beijing for the failure to disarm Iraq. He voices criticism of the UN Secretariat, a subject deserving a separate review, and also acknowledges the counterproductive impact of sanctions directed at the general population. Although he emphasizes the obvious importance of compliance and enforcement, he says very little about what might have been the factor motivating Saddam to comply, to the extent that he did, prior to resolution 1134. Notwithstanding this omission, The Greatest Threat amounts to a convincing plea for placing the challenge posed by weapons of mass destruction at the top of the international agenda.
Compliance Mechanisms for Disarmament Treaties
By A. Walter Dorn
and Douglas S. Scott.
In Verification Yearbook 2000 published by
VERTIC (Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre at 15 - 17 St. Cross
Street, London, EC1N 8UW, U.K. www.vertic.org.
Dr. Dorn is a senior
Research Fellow at Cornell University on the faculty at Pearson Peace-keeping
Centre in Nova Scotia. Douglas S. Scott is President of The Markland Group.
The article (19 pp.)
is organized under the following headings:
Verification of Compliance, Benefits,
Penalties, Principles of Response, National Legislation, Other Mechanisms,
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, Graduated Measures, Domestic Implementing
Agency, Amendment and Review Provisions, Withdrawal Clauses, Learning from
Other Areas of International Law.
It contains a table
of multilateral treaties signed between 1925 and 1997 summarizing the major prohibitions
in each treaty and the compliance provisions.
By Stephen Black
In Verification Yearbook 2000 published by
VERTIC (Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre at 15 - 17 St. Cross
Street, London, EC1N 8UW, U.K. www.vertic.org.
Mr. Black is a
Fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, Boston. From 1993 - 1999, he was the Historian to UNSCOM.
The article [13 pp.]
tells the story of UNSCOM's efforts to bring about the destruction, removal or
rendering harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. It carries the tale
through to December 1999 with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution
1284.
Lessons of the Agreed Framework for Using Engagement as a Non-Proliferation Tool
By Curtis Martin
The
Non-Proliferation Review, Fall 1999, pp.35-50.
The article [15 pp]
identifies a number of problems involved with using incentives as a tool for
obtaining compliance with disarmament obligations. It points to the example of
the Agreed Framework signed by North Korea and the US in October 1994 and
predicts serious problems with the final stages of its implementation.
Honey and Vinegar - Incentives, Sanctions and Foreign Policy
Edited by Richard N.
Haass and Meghan L. O'Sullivan
Washington DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2000, xi, 211pp, US$ 16.95 paper.
The editors have
collected a number of case studies on the use of incentives and penalties by
the US in dealing with China, Iraq, North Korea, South Africa, the Former
Soviet Union and Vietnam. As with Martin's article, the problems of employing
incentive-based engagement are outlined.
The book is reviewed by Margaret Doxey in International Journal,
Autumn, 2000.
The following note appeared
in VERTIC's newsletter Trust and Verify,
November 2000.
A booklet has been published on the issue of how non-state actors
(NSAs), such as rebel groups [engaged] in armed combat with government forces,
might be encouraged to comply with the 1997 Landmines Convention and how their
compliance might be monitored. Unlike
the1997 Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Convention, which applies to
certain NSAs such as armed rebel forces, the Landmines Convention….. applies
only to states.
A March 2000
workshop hosted by the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines recommended encouraging
NSAs to submit reports on their compliance, similar to those required of states
parties under Article 7 of the Convention.
NSAs might also be encouraged to allow external monitoring of their
activities, a measure beyond the scope of the Convention. Opening dialogue, building trust and
creating support for the ban among NSAs were, however, considered to be as
important as drawing them into a formal regulatory framework.
Source 'Engaging
Non-State Actors in a landmine ban workshop summary proceedings, 24-25 March
2000, Geneva. The Non-State Actor Working Group of the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines is continuing work on this issue (see www.icbl.org)
Reviewed elsewhere
in this issue is Richard Butler's book The
Greatest Threat which recounts his experiences as Executive Chairman of
UNSCOM from July 1997 to June 1999 . We
quote here some of his thoughts on enforcement of treaties against weapons of
mass destruction.
… if Saddam gets away with his weapons
program, other states - even those that are reluctant to harbor weapons of mass
destruction - will feel obliged to obtain them as a deterrent … [230]
The treaties against weapons of mass
destruction … were crafted with great difficulty ... The confidence they gave to the peoples of the world has been one
of the great accomplishments of our time - one that has been damaged, hopefully
not irreparably, by the behavior of Iraq… [230]
… the fundamental flaw in the Treaty system [
is ] the unreliability of the
enforcement mechanism… [235]
If we are to save ourselves from the inevitable
use of weapons of mass destruction, either by accident or design, then we must
provide the missing [element]: absolutely assured enforcement of the
obligations under the treaties... [238]
It might prove necessary to build a new
international organization to carry out the work involved in maintaining the
principles and treaties against weapons of mass destruction. Theoretically, a United Nations Council on
Weapons of Mass Destruction could be established with the mandate to receive
progress reports under the treaties, especially reports on infractions, and to
take decisions on the kind of enforcement action needed to be taken, within
which there would be no veto power.
Clearly, this body would have a strong link to the Security Council
because of the latter's overarching mandate for the "maintenance of
international peace and security" In this effort the United States has an
absolutely critical role to play… [239]
By leading the global community in the effort
of reducing and then eliminating the unique danger posed by weapons of mass
destruction, the United States can assure itself the highest and most justly
honored place among nations in the annals of world history… [241]
It has often been argued that even though the
veto went beyond what was intended, in many respects it served as an important
tool in managing the Cold War and possibly saved it from becoming a hot war.
But… [its] use in defense of a state
violating a treaty against weapons of mass destruction is, in my view, a
disaster. [236]
* Sean Howard Ph. D (University of Bradford) is the editor of Disarmament Diplomacy (www.acronym.org.uk) and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Politics, Government and Public Administration at the University College of Cape Breton. He lives in Louisbourg, Nova Scotia.