The Markland GroupFor the Integrity of Disarmament Treaties |
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203-150 Wilson
Street West |
Tel: (905)
648-3306 |
Web site URL: http://www.hwcn.org/link/mkg
This site last modified February 19, 2006 by Documents Unlimited
The
Markland Group was formed in 1987 in order to address the problem of
ensuring compliance with disarmament treaties.
Inter alia, it monitors the behaviour
of treaty parties in relation to compliance and looks for ways to improve
treaty
provisions dealing with verification and compliance.
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· Definition of Terms – cont’d o Foreign-Revenue Control Devices o Information for Contributors |
The Markland Group is composed of a number of professionals, academics and concerned citizens who have come together in the belief that more attention needs to be given to the problem of ensuring compliance under multilateral disarmament treaties.
Its members include international lawyers, persons with expertise in the diplomatic field, parliamentarians, scientists, lawyers, teachers, physicians, and other concerned citizens.
The founder and
president is Douglas Scott, Q.C., a lawyer who practiced in Hamilton, Ontario
for many years until 1985 when he began to devote his full time to the
compliance aspects of disarmament. For
many years, he was the chairman of the Hamilton branch of the Canadian
Institute of International Affairs. Mr. Scott is the principal co-author of Disarmament's
Missing Dimension: a UN Agency to Administer Multilateral Disarmament Treaties
published in 1990 by Science for Peace and Samuel Stephens and Associates. He
is the co-author (with Walter Dorn) of "The Compliance Regime Under the
Chemical Weapons Convention - A Summary and Analysis" in Treaty
Compliance - Some Concerns and Remedies, eds.: Canadian Council on
International Law and the Markland Group (Kluwer Academic Publishers, London,
1998). He is also co-author (with Walter Dorn) of “Compliance Mechanisms for
Disarmament Treaties” in Verification Yearbook 2000, published by
VERTIC, London, 2000.He is a Fellow of the Canadian Institute of International
Affairs for consultation on disarmament issues. For a journalist’s profile of Douglas Scott, see http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ciw-cdm/scott-en.asp
The current members
of the Markland Group Executive Committee are as follows:
Douglas Scott
(retired lawyer) President
Colin Campbell (science teacher)
John Ricketts (business consultant)
Edmund Shaker (lawyer, commercial law)
Brooke Townsend (business executive)
For many years, the
Group has had the benefit of advice from its Consultants
Committee whose members are listed below.
The Group’s funding is supplied by its individual members and occasionally by a foundation for specific projects.
The Markland Group's operations are guided in large measure by a committee of consultants, which meets regularly in Ottawa over the period of an afternoon. The following are the current members of this Committee
James W. Bissett: Formerly, Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Ottawa)
David Carment: Assistant Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (Ottawa)
Walter Dorn: Associate Professor, Canadian Forces College (Toronto, Ontario)
John W. Hilborn: Nuclear Physicist, formerly with Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (Deep River, Ontario)
Jon Jennekens, O.C.: Formerly, Deputy Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency (Ottawa)
Edward G. Lee, Q.C.: Formerly,
Canadian Ambassador to Austria and Member of the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (Ottawa)
John McManus: Past President, Canadian Council on International Law (Ottawa)
Ronald Niblett: Geophysicist,
formerly with the Geological Survey of Canada (Ottawa)
A.W.J. Robertson: Chief Canadian Delegate at the final phase of the negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention (Ottawa)
Michael Shenstone, C.M.: Formerly, Canadian Ambassador to Austria, Member (and 1-year Chairman) of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency
Chris Spencer: Formerly, Senior Advisor, International Organizations, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Ottawa)
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Return to Beginning of The Markland Group's Consultants Committee |
The mission of the Markland Group
is to assist in the task of ensuring compliance with disarmament treaties and the disarmament resolutions of the UN Security Council,
and to provide such assistance primarily by:
a) monitoring the
compliance behaviour of treaty parties to the extent possible through open
sources;
b) monitoring the
performance of treaty administering
organizations such as the OPCW and the IAEA in respect of their
responsibilities for ensuring compliance with a treaty;
c) researching,
developing and promoting policies and measures to enhance compliance with disarmament treaties, as well as policies and
measures to deal with cases of non-compliance on the part of treaty parties and
cases of dereliction of responsibility on the part of treaty administering organizations;
d) conducting and
promoting the study of compliance methodology;
including researching, developing and promoting improved methods for preventing
or deterring treaty violations and improved methods for enforcing compliance
with treaties – including methods suitable for being incorporated within a
treaty or for being adopted by the UN Security Council;
e) analyzing,
explaining, commenting on and publicizing the actions of the UN Security Council
undertaken for the purpose of deterring non-compliance or enforcing compliance
with disarmament treaties or disarmament resolutions.
The Markland Group uses the term “compliance mechanism” to designate a mechanism created by a treaty for the purpose of ensuring compliance that includes some or all of the elements listed below. We regard these as basic elements needed for most disarmament treaties.
a) A treaty administering organization: an inter-governmental body with responsibility for administering the inspections and other aspects of the compliance mechanism whose decisions are sometimes made by consensus and sometimes by vote.
b) Transparency obligations: a series of obligations binding on each State Party requiring it to provide declarations containing comprehensive information about any weapons prohibited by the treaty and any activities related to their production, and requiring it to accept inspections and to cooperate with on-site monitoring arrangements – all for the purpose of determining whether the State Party is complying with the treaty.
c) A clarification system: arrangements to deal with the situation where concerns have been expressed about a particular State Party as a result of information received suggesting that it may be engaged in activities prohibited under the treaty, specifically arrangements whereby the State Party is encouraged to provide additional information to clarify the nature of its activities, and whereby, if appropriate, international pressure can be brought to bear upon the delinquent.
d) An evaluation system: procedures and criteria for evaluating the compliance information received by the Organization with a view to producing an authoritative decision as to whether or not the information indicates a violation of the treaty.
e) An enforcement system: provisions in the treaty for dealing with a State Party that has been found to be violating the treaty and is refusing to rectify the problem; such a system would include arrangements for sanctions to be imposed upon the perpetrator by the treaty parties and might include other measures intended to persuade, compel, reward, induce or force the perpetrator to rectify its violation; but with the understanding that, in any particular case, the UN Security Council might be called upon to deal with the problem, or might itself choose to assume some or all of the responsibility for taking enforcement measures to deal with the problem.
f) Supplementary
provisions: miscellaneous provisions intended to promote compliance
including: mandatory national legislation, trade incentives, restrictions on
withdrawal, provisions to ensure the confidentiality of sensitive information,
and a provision for reference to binding arbitration and unilateral reference
to the International Court of Justice.
Compliance Methodology, as it applies to treaties, can be defined as the study or analysis of methods, strategies, procedures, structures, measures, mechanisms or devices that would be useful for promoting compliance with treaties. Compliance Methodology is concerned not only with methods of dealing with particular compliance problems after they have arisen, but also with institutionalizing the various approaches by incorporating them into treaties as part of a compliance mechanism.
Most compliance problems arising under disarmament treaties could be said to fall into one or more of following categories:
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evidence indicating a possible violation of a fundamental prohibition
of the treaty – such as evidence indicating that a treaty party may have
acquired, stockpiled, deployed or used weapons of the type prohibited by the
treaty or refused to destroy such weapons;
· evidence indicating a possible violation of a fundamental requirement of the treaty, such as a requirement that States Parties declare all their prohibited weapons and destroy them under International supervision;
· evidence indicating that a treaty party may be engaged in dual-capable activities in a manner prohibited by the treaty, such as producing a treaty-controlled substance in larger quantities than necessary for civilian purposes;
· evidence indicating that a treaty party may be refusing to cooperate fully with inspections or other aspects of its transparency obligations;
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evidence indicating that a treaty party may be assisting another country
to obtain the prohibited weapons;
· evidence indicating that a State Party has failed to enact mandatory legislation if such is required by the Treaty.
The Markland Group uses this term to refer to treaty provisions that form part of a compliance mechanism.
The Markland Group most frequently uses the term
“disarmament” in the wider sense of the word so as to encompass
nonproliferation and arms control. (This
concept is often referred to as NACD – Nonproliferation, Arms Control and
Disarmament). Thus, in Markland Group
parlance, the term “disarmament treaty” could refer to a true disarmament
treaty such as the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, or it could refer to a
nonproliferation treaty such as the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or an
arms control treaty such as the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe treaty.
As used by the Markland Group and in various international instruments,
this term refers to activities that are capable of contributing to the
production of the prohibited weapons as well as having a civilian application.
For example, production of the chemical thiodiglycol could be intended
for making ink for ballpoint pens, but it can also be used for making mustard
gas.
This term refers to the type of device developed by the UN Security Council
in the late 1990s in the case of Iraq consisting of an arrangement whereby a
substantial portion of the target country’s revenue from exports was brought
under the control of the Council in order to exert pressure on the target
country to comply with the Council’s disarmament decrees, and pending such
compliance, the device was intended to minimize the impact on the people living
in the target country by ensuring that most of the controlled revenues were
used for their benefit.
The Markland Group uses this term to refer to evidence of malfunctioning
of a treaty administering organization
such as the OPCW in respect of the performance of its responsibilities for
ensuring compliance.
The Markland Group publishes a newsletter entitled Compliance Matters covering matters relative to the problem of ensuring compliance with disarmament treaties, and in particular:
·
news of diplomatic negotiations aimed at reaching agreement on
compliance systems for multilateral treaties;
· the compliance behaviour of States Parties under disarmament treaties;
· the activities of treaty administering organizations (e.g. IAEA, OPCW);
· UN sanctions relating to disarmament or security matters;
· comment on the above matters.
The newsletter is published
three times per year both as an independent item and as part of the Bulletin
published by the Canadian Council for International Law www.ccil-ccdi.ca.
We welcome inquiries about submitting contributions for publication
in our newsletter. Articles should be
accompanied by a short biographical note to appear at the end of the article. The standard length of our articles is 600
words, including title, footnotes and biographical note. Variations from this standard can be
considered through prior arrangements.
Transmission by email is preferable but not essential. The Markland Group offers an honorarium for
articles accepted for publication. See
the payment schedule below.
Since Compliance Matters is a newsletter and not an academic journal, we
are looking for articles written in a non-academic style. For example, the style used in articles on
the op-ed page of newspaper could be taken as a model – but with this
variance: we allow footnotes of the
type that gives source or authority.
Since most of our readers are not following these matters on a daily
basis, a little background material is usually desirable. For more information, consult the editor,
Douglas Scott at 905-648-3306.
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 21,
October 2003
·
The Judgment in Bustani
v. OPCW
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The BWC After the Collapse of the Protocol Process: The
First Meeting of Experts
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 20,
June 2003
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Targeted Sanctions – The Report Of The Stockholm Process
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Booknote: la
Vérification de l'Élimination de l'Arme Chimique by Jocelyn
Clerckx
·
Death Of Paul Szasz
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 19,
April 2003
·
Compliance Procedures and Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol
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Compliance Problems under Europe's Stability and Growth Pact
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 18,
October 2002
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OPCW – Problems with Making Decisions
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 17,
August 2002
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Efforts to Strengthen Biological Weapons Convention in Limbo
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Chemical Weapons – Why No Challenge Inspections? – Two
Possible Obstacles Considered
Compliance Matters,
Issue No. 16, December 2001
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Biological Weapons:
US Proposals Are No Substitute for a Protocol
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OPCW Lacks Funds for Inspections
Compliance Matters,
Issue No. 15, September 2001
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Improving U.N. Sanctions – Security Council Debates Time
Limits for Future Sanctions
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Problems With Transparency and Confidentiality Under the CWC
·
Search for BWC Protocol Collapses
Compliance Matters,
Issue No. 14, April 2001
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Article
Review – Müller, Treaty Enforcement
·
Bold Attempt to focus the BWC Protocol Discussions
·
Compliance with the Requirements of the CWC for the
Enactment of National Legislation
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 13, March 2001
·
Book Review – Butler, The Greatest Threat
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Recent Publications
- Compliance Mechanisms for Disarmament Treaties
- Verification Under Duress
- Lessons of the Agreed Framework for Using Engagement
as a Non-Proliferation Tool
- Honey and Vinegar – Incentives, Sanctions and Foreign Policy
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Can Rebel Groups be persuaded to comply with the Landmines
Convention?
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Richard Butler on Treaty Enforcement
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 12, October 2000
·
Chemical Weapons Convention – Problems With Challenge
Inspections
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Strengthening the Enforcement Provisions in the
Non-Proliferation Treaty
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National Missile Defense — News About the Legal Aspects
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The Special Economic Measures Act — Mr. Axworthy’s
Proposals
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Negotiations on a Protocol to the BWC — An Update
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 11, June 2000
· Biological Weapons
· Legality of Use of Force - Proceedings in the ICJ - Yugoslavia v. NATO Countries
· Book Review – Margaret P. Doxey: UN Sanctions
· Sanctions Against Iraq
· Article Review - Tucker: "After Detection - What?” The 1961 Iklé Article Revisited
· What Ever Happened to "Star Wars"?
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 10, December 1999
· Compliance Matters in Retrospect and Prospect
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 9, September 1999
·
Improving UN Sanctions
- Activity In
the UN General Assembly
- Activity in the Security Council
- Activity Outside the UN
· Book Review - R.T. Naylor: UN Sanctions in Iraq
· Article Review – Mueller and Mueller: “Sanctions of Mass Destruction”
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 8, April 1999
· Nuclear Disarmament in Iraq
· Article Review – T.V. Paul: Coercive Sanctions
· Article Review – Alan Dowty: Sanctioning Iraq
· Sanctions Improvement: Activity at the UN
· Treaty Compliance Problems
· Gaps in the Law Relating to Chemical and Biological Weapons
· Human Rights Instruments
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 7, February 1999
· Measures to Strengthen the Enforcement Provisions in the Non Proliferation Treaty
· What Motivated Milosevic to Sign the Dayton Peace Agreement?
· Efforts to Verify the BWC Continue
· Book Review – Holbrooke: To End A War
· A Report Card on the Operations of the OPCW
· Some Recent Titles Bearing on Compliance Methodology
· Correction
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 6, November 1998
· The Chemical Weapons Convention
· The Biological Weapons Convention
1. BWC Verification Protocol Negotiations
2. Cuba's Complaint Against the US
· The ABM Treaty - Recent Developments
· Iraq: The On-Going Monitoring and Verification System
1.
The Origins of OMV
2.
The Elements of OMV
3.
Dual-Use Items Under OMV
4.
Entry Into Force
5.
Mandatory Legislation
· Book Review – Cortright and Lopez: Economic Sanctions
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 5, December 1997
· The Landmines Treaty
· The Biological Weapons Convention
· The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
· The Chemical Weapons Convention
· A Leak in the Iraqi Oil Sanction
· Appointments
· Markland Group Student Outreach Project
· Commentary
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 4, April 1997
· The Compliance Provisions Under the New Landmines Protocol
· IAEA Safeguards Improvement
· International Criminal Court -- Relevance to Disarmament Treaties
· Verifying Nuclear Disarmament
· Of Interest to Students
· The Markland Group
Compliance Matters, Issue No. 3, August 1996
· The Non-Proliferation Treaty - DPRK - Compliance Measures
· Two New Treaties with Compliance Systems
· IAEA Safeguards Improvement
· The Legal Aspects of Breaches of Confidentiality
· The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – The Compliance Provisions
Compliance Matters,
Issue No. 2, May 1996
·
The Chemical Weapons Convention
a)
Status
b)
Compliance Mechanisms